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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀects of environmental policy on the farmer’s soil optimal
management. We consider a dynamic economic model of soil erosion where the inten-
sity use of inputs allows the farmer to control soil losses. Therefore, inputs use induces
a pollution which is accentuated by the soil fragility. We show, at the steady state,
that environmental tax induces a more conservative farmer behavior for soil, but in
some cases it can exacerbates pollution. These eﬀects can be moderated when farmer
introduces abatement activity.
JEL classiﬁcation : Q12, Q24, Q28, Q52,H23.
Keywords : Soil erosion, pollution, environmental policy, optimal soil conserva-
tion, abatement activities.
1 Introduction
Soil erosion is a major problem for agriculture in most countries and particularly in de-
veloping context. If the rate of soil erosion exceeds the rate of soil genesis, then soil
productivity is expected to decline. Many empirical studies on soil erosion (Papendick,
and al., 1985; Troeh and al., 1991) showed that crop yields decrease with soil depth in the
long run. This diminution of agriculture yields can be compensated by an expansion of
the cultivated land area or an increase in the fertilizer inputs. However, these options are
a sources of negative environmental externalities such as pollution of surface and ground
water. Hence for an optimal soil management, environmental policy is required to take
into account external eﬀects as well as sustainable soil use.
In the literature, the problem of soil degradation is frequently analyzed within opti-
mal control models, since the choice is inherently a dynamic one, involving both temporal
and intertemporal trade-oﬀs. Economic and biophysical factors, such as good prices and
production costs, production technologies, intensity of cultivation, soil depth, and other
productivity-related soil characteristics, determine the agriculture yield. All these factors
have been introduced in dynamic models of resource management (McConnell,1983; Sal-
iba, 1985; Barbier, 1990; LaFrance, 1992; Clarke, 1992; Barret, 1996; Grepperud, 1997;
Goetz, 1998; Goetz and Zilberman, 2000). The aim of these dynamic models is the char-
acterization of conditions for an optimal intertemporally use of soil as a production factor.
While, soil erosion is not only a problem of resource degradation. It also causes negative
agriculture externalities, such as water pollution and sedimentation. Expecting, Loehman
and Randhir (1999) and Hediger (2003), there is no study which integrates optimal in-
tertemporally soil use and oﬀ-farm eﬀect of soil erosion.
In a two-sector model of rural-urban linkage, Loehman an Randhir (1999) study the
types of public policies that satisfy social eﬃciency for soil erosion and pollution stock
externality. The urban sector is assumed to be more wealthy than rural. The types of
1tax/subsidy policies examined range from centralization (with government determining
taxes/subsidies) to complete decentralization (with government determination of an ini-
tial entitlement followed by market decision about pollution reduction). To traditional
Pigouvian and bargaining solutions extended to a dynamic setting, a third alternative is
government as a co-producer of environmental goods.
Hediger (2003) integrates the requirement for an intertemporally eﬃcient and sustain-
able agricultural land use in the presence of soil erosion into analytical framework for the
evaluation of sustainability at the farm level in which both on and oﬀ-farm eﬀects are
taken into account. To sustain the farm income, an agricultural Hartwick rule is pro-
posed which addresses both eﬀects. It requires the farmer to invest the soil rents into
some suitably identiﬁed alternatives of capital. This implies a continuous substitution
of alternative income sources (agricultural or non-agricultural) for traditional sources of
income from crop production that induce persistent soil erosion. Under consideration of
the optimally conditions from the dynamic erosion control problem, this investment rule
enables the farmer to earn a constant income. A charge-subsidy provides an incentive for
pollution control and allows farmers to earn a sustainable income. Under this scheme, the
eﬄuent charge revenues shall be earmarked to subsidize the retirement of cropland and
conversion into extensively used grassland or forest land.
While their models consider both soil erosion and pollution externality, Loehman and
Randhir (1999) and Hediger (2003) have not studied explicitly the eﬀects of the environ-
mental policy on the asymptotic soil management. The aim of this paper is to ﬁll into this
gap and to integrate in the same model, intertemporal eﬃciency management of soil and
pollution externality. We analyze the eﬀects of environmental tax on optimal soil use at
the equilibrium with respect to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of pollution emission in agriculture.
Obviously, soil erosion is a geological process, but the rate of erosion can be dras-
tically increased by intensiﬁed agriculture activity. Under undisturbed vegetation there
is normally a balance between the soil and the erosion. Cultivation of the land usually
interrupts this balance because the vegetation cover is reduced. The soil provides the
growth medium for the plants. As soil and nutrients are removed, the rooting depth for
the plants is reduced. The consequence of lower rooting depth is more severe on shallow
soils, which are predominant on sloping land, than on deep soils. The rate of soil loss,
characteristics of the soil proﬁle, climate and crop grown decide how much soil erosion
lowers the productivity of land. On the back of this soil loss and related yield fall, erosion
also causes surface-water pollution which induce an important social cost.
The surface-water pollution can be seen as point or diﬀuse pollution. The diﬀerence
between them is not so apparent as it may seem at the ﬁrst approach. In some senses, all
pollutants are emitted at a discrete point and are gradually dispersed to varying degrees
as they are spread through the environment. From a policy point of view, the crucial
distinction between point and diﬀuse sources relies on their ease of identiﬁcation and
susceptibility to monitoring. In this paper, our analyze is limited to the case of a point
pollution and ﬁscal environmental policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the general model is
laid out and optimal conditions of soil use are derived. The dynamics analysis of the model
and the steady-state characteristics are examined in section 3. Building on this dynamic
framework, the environmental policy eﬀects on soil management are studied with respect
to diﬀerent pollution emission speciﬁcations. Section 4 considers the case where farmer
2can spend on abatement technologies which reduces his direct emission. Finally, Section
5, summarizes the main ﬁndings.
2 The model
We consider a farm-level model which includes functional relationships and impacts among
farm management choices and soil characteristics. Considered as state variable, soil char-
acteristics incorporate soil depth and other productivity factors. We also include erosion
productivity linkages which relate changes in soil characteristics to agricultural yield func-
tion. The latter supposes explicitly a possible substitution between soil characteristics and
other inputs. The soil characteristics constitute the farmer’s capital stock whose dynamics
is governed by a biophysical and economic process.
2.1 Assumptions
Let ut be an index of inputs (the cultivation intensity), zt, the overall soil depth and yt,
the physical yield per hectare of the crop at date t. The production function of a crop is
then given by:
yt = f (ut,zt) (1)






0. Inputs u and z are necessary to production: f (0,z) = f (u,0) = 0. We impose
fuz = fzu > 0, i.e. marginal productivity of soil increases with the input use. Finally,
function f satisﬁes the asymptotic Inada conditions.
This production function is in line with the work of Saliba (1985), LaFrance (1992),
Clarke (1992), and Hediger (2003). Unlike other studies such as McConnell (1983) or
Barett (1991), soil loss is not being considered as an argument of the function since it is
a result of the choice of u as well as the development of the soil depth over time, rather
than a choice variable for the farmer.
However, the soil depth not only aﬀects crop yields, it also inﬂuences the magnitude of
soil losses for a given amount of rain. Therefore, a per hectare erosion function given by
h(u,z) is introduced. We assume the following properties for erosion function : hu > 0,
hz < 0, huu > 0, hzz > 0, hzzhuu − (hzu)
2 > 0 and huz = hzu < 0. Asymptotic Inada
conditions about the behavior of marginal erosion functions are implicitly assumed to hold.
As the soil depth decreases the soil becomes ﬁner textured and less friable. Further-
more, the low content of organic matter in the subsoil decreases the aggregate stability of
the soil particles such that rain can destroy them more easily. Hence, reduced inﬁltration
and permeability as well as the unstable structure of the soil aggregates together cause
runoﬀ and erosion of the subsoil to increase suggesting hz < 0 1.
An increase in the production intensity will result in higher erosion rates, implying
hu > 0. The structural changes of soil due to water erosion help to determine the sign
of hzz. Rain drops disintegrate on the surface and produce a compact surface crust.
Percolating rainwater dislocates suspended ﬁne soil particles from the top soil to the
subsoil. These changes amplify the magnitude of soil erosion as the soil layers decrease
suggesting hzz > 0. An augmentation of the production intensity leads to higher erosion
rates. However, a simultaneous accretion of the soil adversely aﬀects this increase which
implies huz < 0.
1See Troeh and al. (1991).
3The intertemporal change of the soil depth z at time t is described by:
˙ zt = g − h(ut,zt), z0 > 0 given (2)
where g is the pedogenesis rate, arbitrary taken as constant due to the length of geological
cycles.
In addition to soil erosion, the agricultural activities induce a surface and ground water
pollution. Mineral fertilizer and manure, at levels that exceed crop uptake, constitute the
major sources of agriculture externalities. In territory where agricultural activities are
intensive, this has resulted in phosphorus accumulation in surface runoﬀ and soil erosion
can accelerate the eutrophisation of surface water. This pollution is not taken into account
by farmers, as long as they are not faced with the social cost of their activity. In practice
there is two types of pollution: point and diﬀuse pollution. The diﬀerence between them
is not so apparent as it may seem at ﬁrst blush. From a political point of view, point
sources are characterized by discrete discharge into the atmosphere or water environment,
whereas diﬀuse sources do not have a clearly deﬁned entry points2.
In this paper, we concentrate our analyze on agriculture point pollution. According
to Hediger (2003), we suppose that pollution ﬂow is determined on the one hand by the
rate of surface runoﬀ η(ut), which progressively increases with ut (such that η￿
u > 0 and
η￿￿
uu > 0), and on the other hand by the proportional function of soil erosion rate γh(u,z).
Altogether, this can be written as:
et = η(ut) + γh(ut,zt) (3)
where γ > 0 is the soil pollutant content (i.e. phosphorus) or the soil ﬁxation rate, constant
over time.
The real net revenue of farmer is given by:
πt = pf (ut,zt) − cut − τet
where p and c are the prices of output and input, respectively and τ, the unit taxation
of any positive emission. Given the perfect competition environment, prices are constant
and are taken as given by farmers.
2.2 The farmer’s program
The farmer is assumed to maximize the present discounted value of net returns from
agricultural production with an inﬁnite time horizon. Thus, the farmer’s decision problem









˙ zt = g − h(ut,zt)
z0 > 0 given
et = η(ut) + γh(ut,zt)
where ρ is the discount rate (real rate of interest). Without any loss of generality, we
assume that p is a reference price equal to 1, c > 0 is the real unit cost of input use and
τ the real unit tax.
2Shortle and Abler (2001), and O’Shea (2002) provide a survey on the economics of nonpoint-source
pollution.
4Using Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, the associated Hamiltonian at date t in current
value is:
H (ut,zt;λt) = f (ut,zt) − cut − τ [η(ut) + γh(ut,zt)] + λt [g − h(ut,zt)]
where λt is the costate variable which can be interpreted as the shadow price of soil, or as
the marginal rent of soil.
Optimal necessary conditions for interior solution writes:
fu = c + λthu + τ
￿
η￿ (ut) + γhu
￿
(5)
˙ λt = (ρ + hz)λt − fz + τγhz (6)
and the transversality condition is:
lim
t→+∞
ztλte−ρt = 0. (7)
By diﬀerentiating (5) with respect to time, it comes:
˙ ut =
hu˙ λt + [(λt + τγ)huz − fuz] ˙ zt
[fuu − τη￿￿ (ut) − (λ + τγ)huu]
(8)
where ˙ zt and ˙ λt are determined by (2) and (6), respectively.
Static ﬁrst order condition (5) tells that long any optimal trajectory, the marginal
revenue of cultivation (i.e. the marginal productivity of input use) must be equal to the
marginal cost of cultivation which is threefold: (a) the marginal cost c of using ut units
of input at time t, (b) the marginal cost of cultivation in terms of soil erosion, λthu, (c)
the marginal cost of cultivation in terms of pollution marginal taxation, τ [η￿ (ut) + γhu].
Along the time path, ut must be adjusted to satisfy at any time condition (5).
In the dynamic condition for optimality (6), (ρ + hz) reads as the marginal return rate
of soil, or as the ”soil discount rate”3. Then, (ρ + hz)λt is the marginal return of holding
a unit of non-cultivated soil, λt being the unitary shadow price of soil. The other term
of (6), (fz − τγhz), is the marginal gain of using a unit of soil as input, i.e. the marginal
productivity of soil reduced by the marginal cost of soil in terms of pollution taxation.
Put diﬀerently, it denotes the marginal contribution of soil in the proﬁt function. As a
result, current marginal rent of soil λt grows over time as long as it is more proﬁtable for
farmer to let the soil non exploited rather than to cultivate it.
3 The environmental policy eﬀect
3.1 Dynamic analysis
Our intention is to study the dynamics of the model described above, and to represent it
within a (z,λ) diagram. The time argument t is suppressed for notational convenience.
Beforehand, let ￿ u(z) denote the optimal control under feedback form, solution of (5). The




(λ + τγ)huz − fuz






fuu − λhuu − τ [η￿￿ (u) + γhuu]
. (10)
3The farmer can invest a marginal unit of soil at rate ρ on a ﬁnancial market rather than use it as input.
This ”harvesting” results in a diminution in the soil depth and in an increase of erosion by hz. Then, the
marginal return of soil is reduced by the eﬀect of erosion and the net return rate of soil is (ρ + hz), where
hz < 0.
5Since fuz > 0, huz < 0 by assumption and {fuu − λhuu − τ [η￿￿ (u) + γhuu]} < 0 by con-
cavity of f and convexity of h, then d￿ u/dz > 0 and d￿ u/dλ < 0. Optimal intensity of input
use increases with the soil depth and it decreases with the marginal rent of soil. Hence,
the farmer becomes more conservative by reducing its input use as the soil weakens, which
appreciates its marginal rent.
Deﬁne D1 as the locus of the (z,λ) points where ˙ z = 0, formally D1 =
￿
(z,λ) ∈ IR2
+∗ | ˙ z = 0
￿
.
For any (z,λ) ∈ D1, h(u,z) = g, where g is constant over time. Then, for any (z,λ) ∈ D1,
z and u are constant. From equation (5), we get the equation of the D1-demarcation curve
which is deﬁned as follows:
λ(z) |˙ z=0=
fu (u,z) − c − τ [η￿ (u) + γhu (u,z)]
hu (u,z)
, (11)
for any u such that
·
z = 0. The slope of this curve is measured by:
λ￿ (z) |˙ z=0=
hufuz − [fu − c + τη￿ (u)]huz
(hu)
2 (12)
where [fu − c + τη￿ (u)] can be seen as the ”direct” marginal proﬁt of the farmer’s, i.e. the
part of the marginal proﬁt which excludes the contribution of erosion. From (5), this last
term equals (λ + γ)hu, which is positive for any positive shadow price of soil. Hence, the
D1-demarcation curve is increasing in the (z,λ) plane. Finally, dynamics of z is as follows:
(a) z is constant along the D1-curve, (b) z decreases for any (z,λ) below the D1-curve,
(c) z increases for any (z,λ) above the D1-curve.
Similarly, we deﬁne D2, D2 =
￿
(z,λ) ∈ IR2
+∗ | ˙ λ = 0
￿
. From (6), the equation of
D2-demarcation curve writes:
λ(z) |˙ λ=0=
fz (u,z) − τγhz (u,z)
ρ + hz (u,z)
, (13)
for any u such that
·
λ = 0. The gradient of this curve is determined by:
λ￿ (z) |˙ λ=0=
(ρ + hz)fzz − (ργτ + fz)hzz
(ρ + hz)
2 , (14)
which is negative if (ρ + hz) > 0. We assume (ρ + hz) > 0 so that the D2-demarcation
curve is decreasing in the (z,λ) plane. The optimal dynamics of shadow price is the
following: (a) λ increases is constant along the D2-demarcation curve, (b) λ decreases for
any (z,λ) below the D2-curve, (c) λ increases for any (z,λ) above the D2-curve. Optimal
dynamics of (z,λ) is depicted in Figure 1.




1) of the optimal control problem is determined by the in-
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η￿ (u∗





6Equation (15) means that optimal erosion must be balanced by pedogenesis to main-
tain a constant soil depth. Equation (16) tells that, at the stationary equilibrium, the
farmer is indiﬀerent to cultivate soil or not suggesting a constant marginal rent of soil. In
fact, equation (16) equalizes the marginal return of holding a unit of non-cultivated soil
(left hand side) and the marginal contribution of soil in the farmer’s proﬁts (right hand
side). Similarly, from (17), the marginal beneﬁt in terms of soil conservation the farmer
is expected to earn by reducing its input use by one unit (left hand side) must be equal
to the marginal proﬁt he is expected to earn by increasing its input use by one unit (right















where πu denotes the marginal proﬁt from using input and πz, the marginal proﬁt from
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1) > 0, (19)
fu (u∗
1,z∗
1) − c − τ
￿
η￿ (u∗





In other words, the soil discount rate and the marginal proﬁt function must be positive at
the stationary equilibrium.
This steady-state is represented by E1 in the (z,λ) plane of Figure 1. For any initial soil
depth, z0, only one associated initial shadow price, λ0, places the dynamic system along
one of the two branches of the saddle-path which lead to stationary point E1. Proposition
1 below summarizes all previous results.
Proposition 1 :




deﬁned by equations (15), (16) and (17) if and only if conditions (19) and (20) are satisﬁed.
ii) Under the assumptions that the transversality condition holds and the assumptions
that have been made on functions f and h, (u∗
1,z∗
1,λ∗
1) is a saddle point (see proof in
appendix).
3.2 Discussion on τ
Now, we undertake a sensitive analysis of parameter τ to drawn the eﬀects of the environ-
mental taxation on the optimal conservation of soil. First, as λ(z) |˙ z=0 is decreasing in
τ and λ￿ (z) |˙ z=0 is increasing in τ (see equations (11) and (12) respectively), a reduction
of the lump sum tax results in an upward shift of the D1-demarcation curve with a lower
slope. Second, since λ(z) |˙ λ=0 is increasing in τ and λ￿ (z) |˙ λ=0 is decreasing in τ (see
equations (13) and (14) respectively), then a diminishing tax involves a downward shift of
the D2-demarcation curve with a more steep slope. Such moving are illustrated by Figure
2.
[Place Figure 2 here]
In Figure 2, the stationary point E2 refers to the optimal control problem without any
environmental policy, i.e. when τ = 0. Its comparison with E1 reveals the positive eﬀect
of the taxation on the stationary soil depth, which is the purpose of proposition 2 below.
7Proposition 2 : At the stationary equilibrium, the environmental lump sum tax induces a
more conservative farmer’s behavior for soil management. The soil conservation increases
as the environmental policy becomes restricting for the farmer.
To really understand the complex eﬀects of the environmental policy, it may be ﬁtting
to decompose them. First, from equation (2), erosion must be equal to pedogenesis at the
steady-state. If the stationary soil level increases, then the stationary input use must also
increase in order to maintain erosion constant. Hence, the environmental policy results in
a more conserved soil and an higher intensity of input use. At the stationary equilibrium,
the farmer can compensate the tax surcharge by improving the agricultural yield.
While the eﬀect on z is clearly identiﬁed, the eﬀect on the level of e is ambiguous.
In particular, it depends on the posological characteristics of soil, i.e. on function h and
parameter γ. That can be emphasized by totally diﬀerentiating the emission function:
∆e = η￿ (u)∆u + γ [hu∆u + hz∆z]. (21)






η￿ (u) + γhu
, (22)
where −γhz and [η￿ (u) + γhu] respectively denote the marginal (negative) contribution of
soil conservation and the marginal contribution of input use in the emission of pollution.
Hence, the lump sum tax causes pollution to decrease if the soil conservation the policy
involves is important enough to balance the increment of pollution coming from an increase
in the input use. In other words, the environmental policy exhibits a property of double
dividend if the soil conservation eﬀect overrides the intensity of input use eﬀect which is
risen by the policy in question.
3.3 Discussion on γ
As discussed in inequality (22), the environmental eﬀect of emission taxation is proved to
be ambiguous. In particular, it depends on parameter γ that can be seen as a fragility
index of soil faced to pollution. In Figure 3, we decompose the global eﬀect of pollution
to stress the contribution of soil erosion and the contribution of direct pollution (surface
runoﬀ) on soil conservation.
[Place Figure 3 here]
When the indirect eﬀect of soil erosion on pollution emissions is non-existent, i.e.
γ = 0, then the D1-demarcation curve shifts upward and keeps the same slope whereas
the D2-curve shifts downward and have a more steep slope. We obtain a new steady-
state which is denoted by E3 in Figure 3. The less the emission function depends on soil
erosion, i.e. the smaller is γ, the more taxation acts as a regulator policy of environmental
externalities by reducing pollution emissions and the less this environmental policy favors
the soil conservation in the long run.
84 Pollution abatement
In this second version of the model, we assume that the farmer can invest into abatement
technologies. Indeed, he must choose the level vt of investment which will have an abate-
ment eﬀect on pollution coming only from the surface runoﬀ. Net pollution from surface
runoﬀ at date t is then η(ut)/(1 + vt) where 1/(1 + vt) reads as a cleaning up factor and
vt as the abatement rate. The marginal cost of abatement is b, assumed to be constant





[f (ut,zt) − cut − bvt − τet]e−ρtdt (23)
s.t.
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
˙ zt = g − h(ut,zt)




Static ﬁrst order conditions are:










2 = b. (25)
Condition (24) calls to the same comments than condition (5). Condition (25) equalizes
the marginal beneﬁt of abatement investment and the marginal cost of this abatement.
Equivalently, (24) writes v = [τη(u)/b]
1/2 − 1 : the optimal abatement intensity is an
increasing function of the lump sum tax and the intensity of input use and a decreasing
function of its marginal cost b. Since dynamic optimal condition (6) remains unchanged,
the abatement policy aﬀects the dynamics of z and not the dynamics of λ. The equation
of the D1 representative curve becomes:
λ(z)
a |˙ z=0=
fu (u,z) − c − τ
￿
η￿(u)




for any u and v such that ˙ z = 0 and where subscript a in λ(z)
a means that abatement
eﬀort acts as a control variable. After developments and simpliﬁcations, we have:
λ(z)










where λ(z) |˙ z=0 is deﬁned by (11). Hence, the eﬀect of abatement expenditures in addition
to an environmental tax is the following: from the case without pollution abatement, the
D1-demarcation curve shifts upward whereas the D2-demarcation curve does not react as
illustrated by Figure 4. Proposition 3 summarizes those eﬀects.
[Place Figure 4 here]
Proposition 3 : A positive investment into abatement technologies involves a diminution
of the stationary conservation of soil. This eﬀect is proportional to v/(1 + v) and soil
conservation decreases as v increases.
9The trade-oﬀ between intensity culture and soil conservation remains the same: the
input use increases pollution emissions and soil conservation decreases them. Hence, the
eﬀect of an abatement eﬀort and the eﬀect of the environmental tax on pollution emission
are opposed. Abatement expenditures allow the farmer to reduce its emissions if and only
if the resulting eﬀect on pollution of a diminution in the input use overrides the eﬀect on
pollution of a diminution of the soil conservation. That can illustrated by diﬀerentiating










2∆v + γhz∆z (28)
where (1 + v) = [τη(u)/b]
1/2 and ∆v = (τ/2b)[τη(u)/b]












∆u + γhz∆z (29)
The ﬁrst term of the right hand side of (29) is negative since term in brackets is positive
and ∆u is negative in the case of an increase in the abatement eﬀort (see Figure 4). The
second term is positive since hz < 0 and ∆z < 0. As a result, abatement expenditures














The study of environmental policy eﬀects in agricultural context can not be dissociated
from optimal soil management. This is due to the crucial relationship between, ﬁrst,
observed pollution and second, the weakening level of soil and the intensivity culture.
By considering the pedological characteristics of soil and environmental externalities, we
show that environmental tax induces two eﬀects in the long run: (a) a more conservative
farmer’s behavior in the soil management and (b) an increase in the input use.
To compensate the ﬁscal fees associated to environmental tax, the farmer improves
his agricultural yield by preserving higher depth soil at the steady-state. This allows the
farmer to use more input in the long run at the risk of increasing pollution emissions.
Therefore, these eﬀects depend on the weight of erosion rate into the emission function.
The smaller is this weight, the larger is the positive eﬀect of environmental policy on
pollution and the smaller is the conservation of soil in the long run. The same mechanism
can be obtained with abatement expenditures.
An interesting extension of our model is to study other environmental policy instru-
ments, such as quotas and tradable emission permits, in order to test the robustness of
our main results.
10Appendix: Stability of the steady-state
The stability properties of the steady-state that is characterized in Proposition 1 can
be determined by linearizing the dynamic system in (z,λ) around (z∗
1,λ∗
1). First, deﬁne









(ρ + hz)λ − fz + τγhz
￿
. (30)








(λ + τγ) dhz
dz −
dfz






where dhz/dz = hzz + hzudu/dz, dfz/dz = fzz + fzudu/dz, dhz/dλ = hzudu/dλ and
dfz/dλ = fzudu/dλ. Since hudu + hzdz = 0 at the steady-state, determinant of matrix
J (z,λ) evaluated at (z∗
1,λ∗












Since du/dz > 0, du/dλ < 0 (see (9) and (10) respectively), hu > 0, hzu < 0, hzz > 0,
fzu > 0 and fzz < 0, then detJ < 0 which means that the product of the two eigenvalues
of J is negative. As a result, eigenvalues of J are opposite signed and (z∗
1,λ∗
1) is a saddle
point.
Since the dynamic system allows two converging director vector and two diverging
director vectors, three cases are conceivable for any initial point (z0,λ0):
(a) in quadrant I and II of Figure 1, (z0,λ0) places the dynamic system along one of
the two branches of the saddle path and the system converges to the steady-state;
(b) the dynamic system is initially located in quadrant III or it deviates towards
quadrant III;
(c) the dynamic system is initially located in quadrant IV or it deviates towards quad-
rant IV.
One can check that cases (b) and (c) do not satisfy transversality condition (7) and
then, the only feasible asymptotic solution is (z∗
1,λ∗















Figure 1. Dynamic optimal management of soil erosion.
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Figure 2. Eﬀect of the environmental policy on optimal dynamics.
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Figure 4. Eﬀect of abatement technologies.
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